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FORMAL EXECUTION AND INFORMAL REVOCATION:
MANIFESTATIONS OF PROBATE’S FAMILY
PROTECTION POLICY
Mark Glover*
INTRODUCTION
For millennia, ceremonies have accompanied the exercise of
testamentary power.1 From the early Egyptian dynasties to the Roman
Empire to the time of the Norman Conquest, testators have followed
various formalities while executing their wills.2 With the adoption of the
Statute of Wills in 15403 and the Statute of Frauds in 1676,4 the will
formalities that would eventually find their way into American law
became mandatory elements of valid will execution in England.5 Today,
all states require that a testator follow some of these centuries-old formal
* J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 2008.
1. See Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony—History, Significance, and
Strategies, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 415–18 (1988).
2. See id.
3. Statute of Wills of 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.); see C. Douglas Miller, Will
Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New
Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism,
43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 199 (1991) (providing a brief description of the Statute of Wills).
4. An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 18–21 (1676);
see Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some
Guidance from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1910–12 (1996) (providing a brief
description of the Statute of Frauds).
5. See Beyer, supra note 1, at 415–19; see also Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and
Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 164–66 (1989) (providing a brief description of “[t]he
development of the modern will in England”). “‘Most American states developed their
laws of estates and trusts from English statutes and judicial decisions known to their
legislators at the time of the American revolution, or from English and American statutes
and judicial decisions available as models upon admittance to the union.’” Mark L.
Kaufmann, Note, Should the Dead Hand Tighten Its Grasp: An Analysis of the Superwill,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1023 n.28 (1988) (quoting J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R.
EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 9 (6th ed. 1982)).

411

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185476

GLOVER

412

(Macro Approved 10-27)

Oklahoma City University Law Review

12/4/2012 3:43 PM

[Vol. 34

requirements to validly execute a will.6 Typically these formalities
include requiring that the will be in writing, contain the testator’s
signature, and be attested by at least two witnesses.7 The traditional
justification for will formalities is that they aid the court in fulfilling the
decedent’s intent by protecting against fraud and undue influence and by
providing credible evidence of testamentary intent.8
Fulfillment of testamentary intent provides one explanation of the
presence of formal requirements in the will-execution process, but
perhaps will formalities serve an additional purpose. Legal scholars have
argued that many probate9 doctrines, including will formalities, undue
influence, and mental capacity, provide courts the opportunity to
invalidate wills that make disfavored bequests.10 Specifically, scholars
argue that courts use these doctrines to invalidate testamentary gifts to
nonfamily members: overlooking faulty execution of wills leaving the
decedent’s estate to the family while strictly applying these doctrines in
cases involving gifts to radical political organizations,11 homosexual
partners,12 unmarried cohabitants,13 and other equally disfavored
beneficiaries. This view of will formalities fits nicely with probate’s
firmly established family-protection policy,14 which is evident in a
6. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 202 (7th ed. 2005).
7. Id.
8. In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991); John H. Langbein,
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1975) (“The
formalities are designed to perform functions which will assure that [the testator’s] estate
really is distributed according to his intention.”).
9. “Probate” is used throughout this article generally and not only as the process of
determining the validity of a will. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (8th ed. 2004).
10. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
236–37 (1996); see also E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the
Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture
Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 314 (1999) (“[T]estamentary freedom may be
unfairly abridged when the trier of fact uses doctrines intended to protect testamentary
freedom to redistribute the ‘abhorrent’ testator’s probate estate to a legal spouse or close
blood relations in line with the trier of fact’s majoritarian values and choices.”). But see
Langbein, supra note 8, at 500 (dismissing the possibility that courts use will formalities
to further a “systematic bias toward invalidity”).
11. See, e.g., In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947) (striking down a
bequest to the National Women’s Party based on the testator’s insane delusions).
12. See, e.g., In re Kaufmann’s Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964)
(invalidating a will leaving most of the estate to a homosexual partner with whom the
decedent had been romantically involved for over ten years).
13. See, e.g., Gaines v. Frawley, 739 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App. 1987) (striking down a
bequest to a live-in boyfriend of five years).
14. See Leslie, supra note 10, at 268–73 (describing family-protection policies in the
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number of probate doctrines that explicitly protect familial interests, such
as the elective spousal share, statutes protecting pretermitted heirs, and
the distributive scheme of intestacy.
This article adds to previous scholarly analysis explaining will
formalities as protecting family interests but recognizes a different role
that formal requirements play in family protection. Instead of protecting
family interests by merely providing courts a means to invalidate wills to
nonfamily members, will formalities promote family protection by their
very operation.
Even if courts do not manipulate the formal
requirements of will execution to further a bias in favor of the family, by
requiring testators to follow the mandates of will formalities, the probate
process protects family interests in a number of ways.15
Not only do formal requirements in the will-execution process
further probate’s family-protection policy, but the relative lack of
formalities in the will revocation process also promotes this policy.16
Unlike valid will execution, valid will revocation is relatively easy.17 A
testator can revoke a will by simply tearing it up.18 The testator need not
go through the ceremonial process of writing out a revocation; he need
not affirm the revocation by attaching his signature; no one even need
observe the revocatory act.19 This article asserts that this informal
process of will revocation promotes probate’s family-protection policy20
by channeling a decedent’s estate into intestacy.21 If a decedent dies
without a testamentary plan in place, the estate passes according to the
intestacy statute of the decedent’s home state, which in all states means
property is distributed to the decedent’s family.22 Therefore, the probate
process furthers its family-protection policy not only by requiring a
formal process of will execution but also by providing testators a
relatively easy and informal method of revocation.
U.S. and other western countries); see also Carolyn S. Bratt, Family Protection Under
Kentucky’s Inheritance Laws: Is the Family Really Protected?, 76 KY. L.J. 387, 387
(1988) (“Courts and legislatures always have granted widows some protection from the
economic hardships that their husbands’ deaths cause.”).
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)(2) (1993) (permitting revocation by
“burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or any part of it”).
19. See id.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 59.
22. See id. at 78–80 (describing the basic schemes of intestacy).
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This article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly describes the
historical and modern manifestations of probate’s family-protection
policy. Part II explains the will-execution process and the place of
formal requirements in that process. Part III argues that a formal willexecution process promotes probate’s family-protection policy. Part IV
shifts the focus of the article from execution to revocation and describes
the process by which a testator may revoke a will. Finally, Part V argues
that, like the formal execution process, the informal revocation process
furthers probate’s family-protection policy.
I. PROBATE’S FAMILY PROTECTION POLICY
One of probate’s “principal function[s] is to maintain and perpetuate
the social unit that Americans have traditionally deemed essential for a
stable and productive society—the family.”23 Inheritance laws’ familyprotection function is evident in historical doctrines protecting widowed
wives, as well as in a number of modern probate doctrines such as the
elective spousal share, pretermitted heir statutes, and the distributive
scheme of intestacy. While this list may comprise the most obvious
manifestations of probate’s family-protection policy, it is not exhaustive,
as scholars have recognized other probate doctrines that serve a policy of
family protectionism.24
A. Historical Doctrines
“A prominent characteristic of the American inheritance system
throughout the centuries has been its steady focus on the nuclear
family.”25 This focus on the family can be traced back to several

23. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV.
199, 204 (2001); see EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 76 (6th ed. 2000) (“Many of the policy conflicts in the
area of decedents’ estates and trusts concern the policies favoring freedom of property
disposition as opposed to the policies favoring protection of the family . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 23, at 76 (“Among the most fundamental of
the safeguards provided for a property owner’s immediate family members . . . is the
requirement that those who would make wills be competent and act free of deception or
excessive imposition by others.”); Bratt, supra note 14, at 388–89 (describing the familyprotection function of the probate homestead exemption and the family allowance); Ray
D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1997) (“[F]amily
protectionism is built into the very fabric of the undue influence doctrine.”).
25. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
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doctrines of early English common law that provided for the needs of
widows.26 For example, to satisfy the widow’s immediate needs upon
the death of her husband, the common law provided her the right of
quarantine.27 This right allowed the widow to continue living in the
deceased husband’s house for “forty days after her husband’s death.”28
Similarly, “the right of estrovers [permitted] the widow to take
reasonable sustenance from the decedent’s property including the right to
kill animals for food during her quarantine.”29
While the rights of quarantine and estrovers provided for the
widow’s immediate necessities, the right of dower served her more longterm needs.30 This right provided the surviving wife a claim to a portion
of her husband’s real property that was inheritable by the decedent’s
heirs.31 In medieval England, the right of dower adequately served the
needs of widows because the husband’s real property was the primary
source of familial wealth.32 However, “in the modern era of intangible
wealth, dower makes very little sense and often results in little or no
support at all.”33 As a result, most states have abolished the right of
dower and have adopted more effective, modern, family-protection
measures.34
THE PRESENT

207 (1987).
26. See Bratt, supra note 14, at 387 (“At the earliest common law, a surviving wife
was entitled to dower.”); George L. Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower,
62 HARV. L. REV. 42, 42 (1948) (“From very early times, English law assured to a wife
certain rights in her husband’s property if she survived him.”).
27. See Bratt, supra note 14, at 388; Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:
Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J.
1641, 1660 (2003).
28. Bratt, supra note 14, at 388; Dubler, supra note 27, at 1660.
29. Bratt, supra note 14, at 388.
30. See id. (explaining the relationship between the right of dower and the rights of
quarantine and estrovers).
31. Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to
Whomever I Choose at my Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving
the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 741–47 (2006) (providing a detailed history of the
widow’s right of dower).
32. See id. at 746 (“In jolly old England when land was the major source of wealth for
most well-off families, the dower system actually worked well in terms of adequacy of
support.”). But see Dubler, supra note 27, at 1662 (“A widow’s legal entitlement[] to
dower . . . , although framed by the law as [a] protective measure[] and hailed by legal
commentators as greatly favored, did little systematically to alleviate her often precarious
financial state after her husband’s death.”).
33. Turnipseed, supra note 31, at 746–47.
34. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423. Only four states have not abolished the
right of dower, including Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio.
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B. Elective Spousal Share
Under modern law, probate’s family-protection policy is most
evident in the elective spousal share. This probate doctrine allows a
surviving spouse to take a legislatively prescribed portion of the decedent
spouse’s estate regardless of the terms of the will.35 For example, if a
husband dies leaving a will that completely disinherits his surviving
wife, under the laws of most states, the widow can choose to take a
portion of her husband’s estate.36 If the surviving wife does not wish to
take the elective share, she need not do so, and instead she can take from
the decedent’s estate according to the terms of the will.37 The size of the
elective share varies across jurisdictions, but the typical state statute
allows the survivor to take a third of the decedent spouse’s estate.38
“The policy underlying traditional elective-share statutes . . . is to
protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance by the deceased
spouse.”39 Two theories explain the elective share’s role in providing
this protection. Under the spousal support theory, the elective share
protects a surviving spouse by providing financial support.40 The testator
is free to exercise considerable testamentary power, but a “portion of the
estate is subject to the support obligation toward the surviving spouse.”41
Commentators have recognized several possible sources from which this

See Ark. Code Ann. §28-11-301 (2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §392.020 (2004);
Mich. Comp. Laws §558.1 (2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2103.02 (2004).
In all of these except Michigan, dower has been extended to the husband as
well as the wife. . . . In Ohio and Michigan, the surviving spouse must elect to
take dower, or to take a statutory share of the decedent’s estate, or to take a
share under the decedent’s will.
Id.
35. See id. at 425.
36. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1246 (reporting that forty of forty-one separate property states have
elective share statutes).
37. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 592 (3d ed. 2002); Turnipseed,
supra note 31, at 748.
38. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 37, at 592–93; Turnipseed, supra note 31, at 739.
39. Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into ElectiveShare Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the DeferredCommunity-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 493 (2000).
40. Id. at 493 n.29; J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse’s Forced Share
Be Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 230 (1987).
41. Oldham, supra note 40, at 230.
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spousal support obligation may arise, including “a moral duty that each
spouse owes to the other; expectations of the surviving spouse that he or
she will be supported; or a public desire that the surviving spouse not
rely on the state for support when support is available from the testator’s
estate.”42
The second theory of the elective share’s role in protecting surviving
spouses is based upon “the partnership nature of contemporary
marriage.”43 Under the marital partnership theory, the elective share
recognizes that the surviving spouse contributed to the accumulation of
marital property and, therefore, protects the survivor’s interest in wealth
built over the course of the marriage.44 In other words, the deceased
spouse can dispose of his property through a will but cannot dispose of
the entirety of the couple’s marital property because the surviving spouse
has a right to a portion of those assets.
The spousal support theory and the marital partnership theory are not
necessarily mutually exclusive,45 and under either theory, one can see the
elective share’s role in family protection. Under the spousal support
theory, the elective share protects the family by providing support to a
needy surviving spouse. Under the marital partnership theory, the
elective share protects the family by protecting the surviving spouse’s
property rights in the marital estate.
C. Pretermitted Heir Statutes
In addition to protecting disinherited spouses, the law also provides
some protection to children omitted from their parent’s will. While most
states have enacted some form of pretermitted heir statute, these statutes
vary widely.46 Nonetheless, a common theme running throughout
42. Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal
Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 577 (1995).
43. Oldham, supra note 40, at 231.
44. Newman, supra note 39, at 493 n.29; see WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 37, at
592–93 (arguing that “[e]lective-share law . . . has not caught up to the partnership theory
of marriage” because it does not provide the surviving spouse a claim to “fifty percent . . .
of the couple’s combined assets”); Oldham, supra note 40, at 231 (criticizing the
traditional elective spousal share).
45. Gary, supra note 42, at 577.
46. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 3.5 (2d ed. 2001); see, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 (LexisNexis 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-302 (2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-302 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
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American pretermitted heir statutes is the parents’ ability to intentionally
disinherit their children.47 With one exception, these statutes protect
children only from mistaken disinheritance and not from the parents’
conscious decision to disinherit their offspring.48 Furthermore, these
statutes generally fall into one of two categories.49 The first category
provides a portion of the parent’s estate only to children born after the
creation of the will; children born before will execution are not provided
the same protection.50 The second category protects all unintentionally
omitted children by not discriminating between children born before
creation of the will and those born afterwards.51
Scholars have criticized the pretermitted heir statutes of most states
for not completely protecting children from disinheritance by their
parents.52 Parents have a moral responsibility to care for their children,
and critics of America’s pretermitted heir statutes believe that “[p]robate
laws should not permit a parent to shirk his moral obligation to his minor
child.”53 States could design more effective pretermitted heir statutes by
providing protection from intentional as well as unintentional
disinheritance.54 However, the statutes that are in place do provide a
partial obstacle to the disinheritance of children, which to some extent
protects the testator’s family and furthers probate’s family-protection
policy.

47. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 466; Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the
Child From Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996)
(commending Louisiana as the only state that protects children from intentional
disinheritance); Brian C. Brennan, Note, Disinheritance of Dependent Children: Why
Isn’t America Fulfilling Its Moral Obligation?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 125, 125
(1999).
48. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 466 (“There is no requirement that a
testator leave any property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”); Brashier,
supra note 47, at 1.
49. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 480.
50. Id. see, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (1993).
51. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 480.
52. See Brashier, supra note 47, at 1; Brennan, supra note 47, at 125–26.
53. Brashier, supra note 47, at 26; see Brennan, supra note 47, at 158–63.
54. For example, Louisiana provides that children who are twenty-three years old or
younger at the time of their parents’ death are forced heirs and their parents cannot
disinherit them without just cause. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493–1495 (1996).
Additionally, several countries protect children from disinheritance to a greater extent
than most states. See Brashier, supra note 47, at 1 n.3.
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D. Intestacy
If a decedent did not create a will, the probate court will distribute
the estate according to the distribution scheme of an intestacy statute.55
Under the intestacy statutes of all states, the estate is distributed within
the decedent’s family.56 Close family members benefit first (i.e.,
surviving spouses,57 children, or parents), and more remote relatives
benefit if closer relatives are no longer living.58 The primary goal of
intestacy is to distribute the estate in accordance with the decedent’s
probable wishes; an intent the law assumes is to direct assets to surviving
family members.59 The assumption that most testators would leave the
bulk of their estates to their families appears to be correct. “Despite
almost complete testamentary freedom, Americans have whenever
possible limited their substantial bequests to spouse, sons, and
daughters.”60 Indeed, scholars have conducted a number of probaterecord surveys that confirm that the vast majority of testators distribute
their estates within the family.61
Though fulfillment of the decedent’s probable intent is the primary
goal of intestacy laws, “the desires of normal or average decedents do
not provide the sole basis for framing or justifying an intestacy

55. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 59 (describing intestacy as the “default
rule” that “lawyers plan around”).
56. See id. at 78 (“If the decedent is not survived by a spouse, descendant, or parent, in
all jurisdictions intestate property passes to brothers and sisters and their descendants.”).
57. “Under current law, the surviving spouse usually receives at least a one-half share
of the decedent’s estate. There are many variations in the specifics, however . . . .” Id. at
63.
58. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (1993).
59. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 62–63.
60. SHAMMAS ET AL., supra note 25, at 207; see JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND
TRUSTS CASES AND MATERIALS 158 (2d ed. 2003) (“Most people who write wills leave
the bulk of their property to close family members, and particularly to spouses.”).
61. See, e.g., Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 254 (1962) (reporting that a study of the
probate records of Cook County, Illinois, for the years of 1953 and 1957, shows that most
testators left their estates to a surviving spouse or, if no surviving spouse, to surviving
descendents); Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women’s Rights in Inheritance, 19
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 21–30 (2008) (reporting in a study of the probate records of
Los Angles County from 1893 that most testators left the bulk of their estates to family);
Edward H. Ward & J. H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L.
REV. 393, 413 (1950) (reporting that in a study of Wisconsin probate proceedings from
the 1930s and 1940s that “practically all testators transferred their property ‘within the
family.’”).
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[statute].”62 In fact, other considerations, besides the decedent’s
probable intent, may be of greater importance when formulating a
distributive scheme in the absence of a will.63 However, regardless of
the relative importance of intestacy laws’ policy goals, one “policy of the
intestacy laws is family protection.”64
The primary way in which intestacy laws achieve their familyprotection goal is by directing assets to the family. Specifically,
distributive schemes under intestacy direct assets to the surviving
relatives in order “to protect the financially dependent family.”65 If the
primary economic provider dies, leaving immediate family members
who are unaccustomed to providing for themselves, intestacy laws
protect these family members by distributing the decedent’s assets to
them. “Protection of financially dependent family members benefits not
only an intestate’s dependents who inherit under well-crafted intestacy
statutes, but also other family members and the public at large, upon
whom the burden of supporting the dependents would otherwise
fall . . . .”66 Therefore, directing assets to closely related family members
not only protects the decedent’s immediate family by alleviating their
economic need but also protects the decedent’s extended family by
reducing the burden of support that would ultimately fall on more remote

62. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States
and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (1969).
63. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
321, 324 (1978) (“If society’s well-being requires a distributive pattern different from the
determined wishes of intestate decedents, the decedents’ wishes should be
subordinated.”); Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy
Provisions for Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 946 (1995)
(“[S]atisfying a decedent’s presumed intentions seems relatively unimportant in
comparison to more compelling goals of intestacy schemes, such as producing a fair
pattern of distribution among surviving family members and serving society’s
interests.”).
64. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 64; see Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy
Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 27 (2000) (“Intestacy statutes attempt to
distribute a decedent’s property to the decedent’s family, either because the intestacy
statute strives to approximate the decedent’s wishes or because society has decided that
intestacy statutes should benefit and strengthen families if a decedent does not express a
contrary wish in a will.”); Jennifer Seidman, Comment, Functional Families and
Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
211, 225 (2004) (“Intestacy law’s social and economic aims reflect an intent to protect
financially and emotionally committed family units.”).
65. Lomenzo, supra note 63, at 947.
66. Id.
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relatives.
Intestacy laws also protect familial interests by fulfilling the
expectations of the family members who benefit from the distribution.
The vast majority of decedents that execute a will leave their estates to
family members.67 As a result, relatives form expectations that a
decedent’s estate will be distributed within the family.68 By distributing
the decedent’s estate to these family members and fulfilling their
expectations, intestacy laws avoid dissatisfaction among surviving
relatives and promote family harmony.69
The final way that intestacy laws protect familial interests is by
treating the family as a single economic unit.
Consistent with . . . the partnership theory of marriage, intestacy
law logically assumes that those to whom a person is
economically tied during life would be those for whom the
decedent intended to provide upon death. [Additionally], this
emphasis implies that long-term economic investments and
decisions often reflect a desire to provide for self and family
both in the present and in the future.70
Therefore, intestacy laws protect a group of relatives as a single
economic unit, thereby “promot[ing] and encourag[ing] the nuclear
family.”71
In sum, intestacy laws provide the plan of distribution of a
decedent’s estate in the absence of a will and promote probate’s familyprotection policy by distributing the estate’s assets to the decedent’s
relatives. Intestacy laws distribute a decedent’s estate so effectively that
courts have occasionally questioned the appropriateness of permitting
67. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
68. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 587–88 (1999) (explaining that family
members form expectations of inheritance through knowledge “of the cultural tradition of
passing wealth intergenerationally” and because “a devise flows naturally as the final act
of reciprocity in an ongoing relationship”).
69. See Lomenzo, supra note 63, at 946-47 (“Producing a fair pattern of distribution
among surviving family members involves creating a pattern ‘that the recipients believe
is fair and thus does not produce disharmony within the surviving family members . . . .’”
(quoting LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 71 (1991))).
70. Seidman, supra note 64, at 222 (citation omitted).
71. Lomenzo, supra note 63, at 947.
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testamentary dispositions.72 Indeed, the Supreme Court of California
once declared that “[i]n the absence of any will, the law makes a wise,
liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead man’s estate; so wise . . .
that the policy of permitting wills at all is often gravely questioned.”73
Despite this skepticism, California follows the majority’s lead and allows
decedents to dispose of their assets through a will.74 Nonetheless, this
testamentary freedom does not diminish probate’s interest in family
protection. However, before one can see how probate protects the
families of decedents who exercise their testamentary power, one must
first understand the process of will execution and the role of formal
requirements in that process.
II. WILL EXECUTION
A. Freedom of Testation & Testamentary Intent
“The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation.”75 In
other words, the law generally allows a testator to dispense his estate at
death as he so chooses. However, in order to ensure that the will
disposes of the estate in accordance with the decedent’s intent, a testator
must meet certain basic requirements to exercise this testamentary
power. First and foremost, the testator must possess a minimum level of
mental capacity.76 The Restatement of Property explains that a testator
“must be capable of knowing and understanding in a general way the
nature and extent of his or her property, the natural objects of his or her
bounty, and the disposition that he or she is making of that property.”77
Furthermore, the testator must be able to understand these three elements
72. See Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1994) (“[O]ne occasionally glimpses a belief that
intestacy should have a privileged status.”).
73. In re Walker’s Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895).
74. See In re Silva’s Estate, 145 P. 1015, 1016 (Cal. 1915) (“A will is always to be
interpreted so as to prevent intestacy if such interpretation is reasonably possible.”); In re
Buechley’s Estate, 128 A. 730, 731 (Pa. 1925) (“[A] construction [of a will] should be
adopted that avoids intestacy.”).
75. Langbein, supra note 8, at 491.
76. See Pyle v. Sayers, 34 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“Every person of
sound mind and disposing memory has the untrammeled right to dispose of his or her
property by will as he or she pleases.”); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 146.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 8.1(b) (2003); see also M.I. Marshall &
Ilsley Trust Co. of Ariz. v. McCannon (In re Estate of Killen), 937 P.2d 1368, 1371
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Cunningham v. Stender, 255 P.2d 977, 981 (Colo. 1953).
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in relation to each other and must be capable of forming a desire to
dispose of his property based on this understanding.78 This level of
mental capacity is relatively low and is generally recognized as a lower
level of capacity than that required to enter into a contract.79 If a testator
lacks this requisite mental capacity, he is unable to formulate a
testamentary intent and, therefore, is unable to create a valid will.80
Second, the testator must be free of fraud and undue influence. This
requirement ensures that the will carries out the testator’s intent and not
the wishes of someone else.81 Fraud and undue influence are similar yet
distinct concepts.82 “Fraud occurs where the testator is deceived by a
misrepresentation and does that which the testator would not have done
had the misrepresentation not been made.”83 Unlike fraud, which is the
result of deception, undue influence is the result of coercion and occurs
when one “subverts the will of the testator and replaces the will of the
testator with that of the one doing the influencing.”84 A will subject to
either fraud or undue influence does not reflect the testamentary intent of
the decedent, and, consequently, the law does not recognize such will as
valid. In sum, the doctrines of mental capacity, undue influence, and
fraud are “ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testator
formulated testamentary intent.” 85 If a decedent lacked mental capacity
or was the victim of undue influence or fraud, he did not form a
testamentary intent or validly exercise testamentary power.
B. Will Formalities
Though testamentary freedom has consistently been heralded as the
bedrock of America’s law of wills,86 testators have never been free to
78. See 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.21 (William J. Bowe et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS].
79. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 145–46. “Legal capacity to make a will
requires a greater mental competency than is required for marriage, however.” Id. at 146.
80. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 12.46.
81. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting From Meretricious
Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200,
201 (1989).
82. See Madoff, supra note 24, at 576 (“[T]he undue influence doctrine is akin to the
doctrines of fraud and duress in its attempt to protect testators’ rights to freely dispose of
their property.”).
83. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 186.
84. Madoff, supra note 24, at 576 n.12.
85. Leslie, supra note 10, at 236–37.
86. See In re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“A
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create their wills in whatever method they so choose.87 In addition to
possessing the requisite mental capacity and exercising testamentary
power free of fraud and undue influence, a testator must adhere to
several formal requirements in the execution process to validly create a
will. These formal requirements have ancient roots and eventually found
their way into American law through the colonial adoption of the English
common law and through the influence of English statutes on American
legislators.88 Though the formal requirements of will execution vary
somewhat from state to state, all states require three basic formalities for
the valid execution of a will.89 These basic formalities include that the
will be in writing, contain the testator’s signature, and be attested by at
least two witnesses.90
All states require that the will be in writing,91 and usually, both typed
and handwritten documents are sufficient.92 Additionally, all states
require that the testator sign the will.93 In most states, however, another
may sign the will if expressly directed by the testator.94 States differ on
testator’s right to bestow his property by will at death is as absolute as his right to convey
it during his life time.”); WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 37, at 581 (“Freedom of
disposition is the hallmark of the American law of succession.”); J. Andrew Heaton,
Comment, The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will: Should “Negative Wills” Be
Enforced?, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 183 (1985) (“The principle of testamentary freedom
is the cornerstone of the Anglo-American law of succession . . . .”); Adam J. Hirsch, The
Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 632 (1989) (“[C]ourts
traditionally exalt freedom of testation and the fulfillment of testamentary intent as
central to gratuitous transfers policy.”); Langbein, supra note 8, at 491; Spitko, supra
note 10, at 278 (“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”).
87. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 365 (“‘[F]ree testation’ refers
only to the choice of people who are to share in one’s estate; it does not apply to the
manner in which the document of gift is drawn up.”).
88. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 2.18; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at
202 (describing the influence of the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act of 1837); Beyer,
supra note 1, at 418–19.
89. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 202.
90. Id.
91. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.5; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502 (West
2005); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040
(LexisNexis 1999).
92. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.6.
93. Id. § 19.40; see, e.g., § 732.502(1)(a)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-2 (West 2004);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(a) (Vernon 2007).
94. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.45 (“All but four states, Connecticut,
Louisiana, New Jersey and Utah, now authorize and provide for a signature by some
other person for the testator . . . .”); see, e.g., § 394.040; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3(b)
(2007).
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where the testator’s signature must be located, as some states require that
the testator sign the will at the end of the document95 and others allow
the testator to sign anywhere on the will.96 Finally, “[m]ost of the
American states have adopted statutes which require attestation and
subscription by witnesses.”97 This formality requires that the witness
observe the execution of the will and sign the testamentary document.98
Most states require two attesting witnesses, while a minority of states
require three.99 In sum, a testator has great latitude in planning the
substance of his testamentary scheme, but the testator does not enjoy the
same freedom during the process of executing the testamentary
document because he must comply with the statutorily-prescribed formal
requirements.
C. Functions of Will Formalities
Will formalities “should have a clearly demonstrable affirmative
value [because they] always present[] the possibility of invalidating
perfectly genuine and equitable transfers that fail to comply with
[them].”100 Courts and scholars have recognized that the value of will
formalities stems from their ability to aid the court in distributing an
estate in accordance with the testator’s wishes.101 In their classic article
Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, Gulliver and Tilson identified
three functions of formalities that aid courts in fulfilling testamentary
intent.102 These functions include the ritual, evidentiary, and protective
functions.103 Almost thirty-five years later, Professor Langbein added to
Gulliver and Tilson’s analysis by identifying the channeling function of
will formalities.104 Generally speaking, these four “functions . . . assure

95. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.57; see, e.g., § 732.502(1)(a)(1).
96. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.54; see, e.g., § 3A:3-2.
97. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.73, at 138.
98. Id. § 19.74.
99. Id. § 19.75. Louisiana requires the presence of two witnesses as well as that of a
notary public. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (2000).
100. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers,
51 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1941).
101. See In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991) (“The primary
purpose of [will] formalities is to ensure that the document reflects the uncoerced intent
of the testator.”); Langbein, supra note 8, at 492.
102. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 5–13.
103. Id.
104. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 493–94.
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that [the testator’s] estate really is distributed according to his
intention.”105
i. The Ritual Function
Will formalities force testators to consider the consequences of will
formation and impress upon them the legal nature of the process.106
Formalities collectively encourage testator contemplation through “the
general ceremonial” nature they provide the will-formation process and
“preclude[] the possibility that the testator was acting in a casual or
haphazard fashion.”107
Langbein described this function as the
cautionary function and explained that will formalities “caution the
testator[] and . . . show the court that he was cautioned.”108
As will formalities collectively serve the ritual function, several
formal requirements do so individually. The writing requirement
prohibits informal oral declarations of testamentary intent and forces the
testator to expend more thought and effort when planning a testamentary
scheme.109 Furthermore, “[t]he signature [requirement] tends to show
that the instrument was finally adopted by the testator as his will and
[also tends] to militate against the inference that the writing was merely a
preliminary draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling.”110
Lastly, the presence of witnesses during the will-execution process adds
to the overall ceremonial nature of the event. In total, will formalities
fulfill their ritual function by making it “difficult to complete the [willexecution process while] remain[ing] ignorant that one is making a
will.”111
ii. The Evidentiary Function
Determining the validity of wills has inherent evidentiary obstacles.

105. Id. at 492.
106. Id. at 495. “One purpose of many of the forms is to impress the testator with the
seriousness of the testatment, and thereby to assure the court ‘that the statements of the
transferor were deliberately intended to effectuate a transfer.’” Id. (citing Gulliver &
Tilson, supra note 100, at 3.
107. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 5.
108. Langbein, supra note 8, at 495.
109. See id.
110. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 5 (footnote omitted).
111. Langbein, supra note 8, at 495.
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First, the testator is usually dead at the time of probate.112 Consequently,
the court lacks the opportunity to question the testator to determine his
testamentary intent.113 Second, long periods of time may lapse between
will execution and probate.114 During this time witnesses may die or
their memories may fade.115 Will formalities are “unusual probative
safeguards” that aid in overcoming these obstacles by providing
“evidence of testamentary intent . . . in reliable and permanent form.”116
Perhaps the most useful formality in providing evidence of
testamentary intent is the requirement that the will be in writing. “A
written statement of intention may be ambiguous, but, if it is genuine and
can be produced, it has the advantage of preserving in permanent form
the language chosen by the testator to show his intent.”117 Furthermore,
the requirement of attestation before disinterested observers provides the
court potential witnesses to testify regarding the testator’s competency
and potential problems of undue influence.118 Finally, the general
signature requirement “produce[s] evidence of genuineness,”119 and the
requirement that the signature appear at the end of the document
provides evidence that no one added to the will after its execution.120
iii. The Protective Function
Will formalities “protect the testator against several things including:
112. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 6. Statutes in three states now allow probate
during a testator’s life. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-08.1-01 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (LexisNexis 2007). “These
statutes authorize a person to institute during life an adversary proceeding to declare the
validity of a will and the testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence of the
person executing the will.” DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 156.
113. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 6.
114. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 492 (explaining that “years, even decades” may
pass from the date of formation to the time of probate).
115. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 493.
119. Id.; see Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 7 (“The requirement of the testator’s
signature also has evidentiary value in identifying, in most cases, the maker of the
document.”).
120. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 7 (“[T]he requirement that the will be
signed at the end has an evidentiary purpose of preventing unauthenticated or fraudulent
additions to the will made after its execution by either the testator or other parties.”);
Langbein, supra note 8, at 493 (“The requirement that [the testator] sign at the end
prevents subsequent interpolation.”).
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fraud, undue influence, mistake, and fraudulent suppression of a valid
will after the testator dies.”121 The attestation formality provides the bulk
of this protection by requiring witnesses who can deter potential
“scoundrels” from interfering in the execution of the will and who can
later testify as to the validity of the process.122 Additionally, the
formality requirement that witnesses be disinterested serves the
protective function because witnesses who are not testamentary
beneficiaries will “not be financially motivated to join in a scheme to
procure the execution of a spurious will by dishonest methods.”123
Finally, the writing requirement protects against fraud by preventing
testators from making oral testamentary dispositions that leave no
evidence of testamentary intent and that are more susceptible to fraud
than written wills.124
iv. The Channeling Function
As Professor Langbein explained, “[c]ompliance with the Wills Act
formalities for executing witnessed wills results in considerable
uniformity in the organization, language, and content of most wills.”125
In other words, by requiring every testator to comply with specific
formal requirements, all wills tend to look the same. As a result, courts
more easily identify and interpret the decedent’s testamentary intent.126
Additionally, will formalities encourage testators to seek legal advice to
ensure compliance with the formal requirements.127 This further
standardizes most wills and therefore advances the channeling
function.128

121. JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, RITCHIE,
AND TRUSTS CASES AND MATERIALS 194 (2003).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 11.
See Miller, supra note 3, at 274.
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 494.
Id.
See Friedman, supra note 87, at 368.
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 494 & n.26.

ALFORD AND EFFLAND’S ESTATES
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D. Compliance with Will Formalities
i. Strict Compliance
“The traditional rule is that the formalities required by the Wills Act
must be complied with strictly, and almost any mistake in execution will
invalidate the will.”129 Though will formalities are seen as aids in
determining testamentary intent,130 some courts have required strict
compliance with will formalities even when fully satisfied that the
decedent intended to create a will.131 For example, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals heard a case in which the decedent failed to
sign his will in the presence of the statutorily-required witnesses and also
failed to observe the witnesses sign the will.132 The court ruled the will
invalid and held that the “mere intent by a testator to execute a written
will is insufficient. The actual execution of a written will must also
comply with the dictates of [the statutorily-prescribed will
formalities].”133
ii. Substantial Compliance
Requiring strict compliance with will formalities has drawn much
criticism. One dissenting judge criticized a majority opinion strictly
applying the state’s will formalities by writing, “[t]he majority once
more takes a very technocratic approach to the law, slavishly worshiping
form over substance.”134 Likewise, scholars have long criticized will
formalities for undermining the decedent’s testamentary intent in
situations where the defect in will execution appears trivial.135 As a
129. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 225.
130. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 492.
131. See Miller, supra note 3, at 222 (“In [some] cases, there is no question as to the
testator’s intent, but probate is denied because . . . of failure to comply with [will]
formalities.”).
132. Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611–12 (W. Va. 1998).
133. Id. at 613.
134. Id. (Workman, J., dissenting).
135. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 489 (“The most minute defect in formal
compliance is held to void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect
was inconsequential.”); see also Kelly A. Hardin, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act
Formalities and the Need for a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1145, 1145–47 (1993); Mann, supra note 72, at 1036 (“Courts have routinely
invalidated wills for minor defects in form even in uncontested cases and sometimes even
while conceding—always ruefully, of course—that the document clearly represents the
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result, in the mid-1970s proponents of substantial compliance began to
urge for the abandonment of the “mistaken and needless” adherence to
“harsh and relentless formalism.”136
Professor Langbein, the “architect” of substantial compliance,137
proposed that a court should validate a will that does not comply with
every will formality if “the noncomplying document express[es] the
decedent’s testamentary intent, and [if] its form sufficiently
approximate[s] Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it
serves the purposes of the Wills Act.”138 Thus, the substantial
compliance doctrine does not simply ignore will formalities but applies
them purposively.139 If a decedent intended to create a will and if the
ritual, evidentiary, protective, and channeling functions were served, a
court should deem that the formal requirements were fulfilled and
recognize the document as a validly-executed will.140 The movement
toward substantial compliance has received significant support from
academics, but the reaction of courts is less clear.141 Some jurisdictions
have explicitly adopted the substantial compliance doctrine,142 but even
these courts have noted that “resort to the substantial compliance
doctrine is infrequent at best.”143
iii. The Dispensing Power
Displeased with courts’ applications of the substantial compliance
doctrine, Professor Langbein began to favor the adoption of a dispensing
power, under which the court would focus not on whether the purposes
of will formalities were accomplished but solely on whether the decedent
intended to create a will.144 Based on observations from Australia’s use
wishes and intent of the testator.”).
136. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 489.
137. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 233.
138. Langbein, supra note 8, at 489.
139. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A
Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–7
(1987).
140. See id.
141. See Bonfield, supra note 4, at 1906 (“[While] American courts ha[ve] given
Langbein’s plea for adopting substantial compliance a cool reception, academic
commentators are nearly uniform in their support for a broad remedy for validating wills
that do not conform to the letter of will execution statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See, e.g., In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991).
143. In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81, 90–91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003).
144. See Langbein, supra note 136, at 7.
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of both the substantial compliance doctrine and the dispensing power,
Langbein concluded that “courts read into their substantial compliance
doctrine a near-miss standard, ignoring the central issue of whether the
testator’s conduct evidenced testamentary intent.”145 Therefore, he
suggested that courts should not attempt to deem defective wills as
compliant with will formalities but should simply dispense with formal
requirements when testamentary intent is clear.146
The dispensing power has garnered some support. For instance, the
Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) codified the dispensing power by
adopting a harmless error standard.147 Under the harmless error standard,
a writing that lacks the formal requirements of will formation may
nonetheless constitute a validly executed will “if the proponent of the
document . . . establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document . . . to constitute . . . the decedent’s
will.”148 Six states149 and the Restatement of Property150 have adopted
the UPC’s harmless error standard.
III. FORMAL EXECUTION AS FAMILY PROTECTION
Now that the background of will execution and probate’s familyprotection policy has been explained, one can appreciate the role a
formal will-execution process plays in accomplishing family protection.
Formal will execution furthers probate’s family-protection policy in a
number of ways, including making the exercise of testamentary power
difficult, encouraging testators to think about specific family needs when
creating a testamentary plan, fostering efficient administration of the
probate estate, and providing the testator a therapeutic experience during
a potentially stressful time. This list is not necessarily comprehensive, as
a formal will-execution process may further probate’s family-protection
policy in various other ways.
145. Id. at 53.
146. See id. at 6–7.
147. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1993).
148. Id.
149. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 234 (identifying “Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah” as having adopted the UPC harmless error
standard).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
(1999) (“A harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the proponent establishes
by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent adopted the document as his or her
will.”).
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A. Barriers to the Exercise of Testamentary Freedom
In 1975, Professor Langbein suggested that courts might use will
formalities as a means to invalidate testamentary dispositions to
beneficiaries whom they disfavor.151 Langbein “suspect[ed] that in
construing whether particular conduct amounted to compliance with a
required formality, the courts are silently looking to other factors,
including the testator’s ‘fairness’ to his family and others.”152
Invalidation of disfavored wills would then serve a family-protection
policy by directing the estate through an intestacy statute to the
decedent’s relatives.153 However, Langbein “confidently reject[ed] the
notion that judicial insistence on literal compliance with the Wills Act
formalities is a surrogate for unexpressed hostility to free testation”
because he believed courts examined wills with a “presumption against
intestacy” and because most wills better provide for a surviving spouse
than do most intestacy statutes.154
However, Professor Langbein’s dismissal of “a disguised policy
preference for the family protection system of . . . intesta[cy]”155 has not
gone unchallenged. Professor Melanie Leslie asserts that “courts impose
upon testators a duty to provide for those to whom the court views as
having a superior moral claim to the testator’s assets, usually a
financially dependent spouse or persons related by blood to the
testator.”156 Furthermore, she argues that “[c]ourts impose and enforce
this moral duty to family through the covert manipulation of doctrine,”157
the precise argument that Professor Langbein rejected twenty years
earlier. In support of her argument, Professor Leslie studied a number of
probate cases and discovered numerous instances where courts validated
one will leaving the bulk of the estate to family members and invalidated
another will disinheriting close relatives, despite both wills equally
complying with the required formalities.158 Professor Leslie concluded
151. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 499–500.
152. Id. at 500.
153. See id. at 499–500 (describing the family-protection function of intestacy).
154. Id. at 500.
155. Id.
156. Leslie, supra note 10, at 236.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 258–68 (describing a number of cases in which courts inconsistently
applied will formalities apparently to further a family-protection policy, including cases
involving the requirement that the testator sign the will and the requirement that
witnesses sign the will in the presence of the testator).
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that “the decisions often hinge on whether the testator has preferred
distant or non-relatives over more immediate family and [whether] the
court can[] infer a sufficient justification.”159
Regardless of whether courts purposefully manipulate the formal
requirements of will execution to further a family-protection policy or
blindly apply them with no hidden agenda, will formalities are barriers to
the valid execution of a will. Put differently, absent formalities, testators
would more easily exercise their testamentary power.160 Compliance
with will formalities can be a tedious process that requires close attention
and often the time and money to consult an attorney.161 As a result, “will
making may seem daunting and the formality and ritualized nature of the
venture may act as a barrier for people who might otherwise make a
will.”162 In addition to deterring people from attempting will execution,
formalities also frustrate the testamentary intent of some of those who do
try to create a valid will. Critics of strict compliance routinely argue that
will formalities frustrate testamentary intent because of the burdens they
place on prospective testators,163 and courts invalidate wills that they
acknowledge clearly express the testator’s intent.164
159. Id. at 260.
160. See id. at 274 (reporting that by eliminating some formal requirements in the willexecution process “the drafters [of the Revised UPC] believe they have removed a
needless barrier to the probate of documents that embody testamentary intent”).
161. See In re Taylor’s Estate, 100 A.2d 346, 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953)
(“Indeed one not so advised may easily trip in the execution of those formalities, and it
would rather seem that the Legislature may have intended him therefore to look to
counsel for assistance.”); Friedman, supra note 87, at 368 (“[will formalities] encourage
the use of middlemen (lawyers)”); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 100, at 18 (“Doctrinal
barriers to the effectuation of intent are raised most frequently by the requirements of the
statutes of wills, because they are more complex and less likely to correspond with
instinctive human actions . . . .”).
162. DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 121, at 194–95.
163. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 489; Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to
Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error
Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 579 (2007) (“[O]ver-enforcement of Wills Act
formalities . . . can result in frustration of testator intent.”); Mann, supra note 72, at 1036.
164. See Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication,
63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 39 (1985) (“Courts routinely invalidate wills because of minor
defects in execution, even when no one questions that the will represents the wishes and
intent of the testator.”); see, e.g., In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1015 (N.J. 1987))
(“If the testator has not complied with the statutes which regulate the execution of the
will, his intention to pass his property by will has no legal effect; and it will be ignored
by the courts.” (quoting PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 19.4); Murray v. Lewis, 121 A.
525, 527 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (“A writing may express clearly the wish or intention of a
decedent, but if the statutory formalities have not been followed, it is not a valid will,
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Despite the burdens and potentially harsh consequences that
accompany will formalities, all states require that testators comply with
certain formal requirements in the will-execution process.165 The ritual,
evidentiary, protective, and channeling functions of will formalities
partially explain this restriction on will formation.166 However, the law’s
distrust of testators to adequately provide for their families, as
exemplified by numerous family-protection measures such as the elective
spousal share and pretermitted heir statutes,167 may also provide an
explanation of why the law dissuades some potential testators from
creating wills and makes the execution process difficult for those who
do. While the law provides testators great freedom to dispose of their
estates as they so desire, the law also places formal requirements in the
will-execution process, which serve as potential stumbling blocks in the
valid exercise of that testamentary freedom. If the testator fails to hurdle
these barriers by not complying with the statutorily mandated will
formalities, the probate court will invalidate the will. Without a will, the
decedent’s estate passes through intestacy and ultimately ends up in the
hands of the decedent’s family.168 Therefore, because it ushers decedents
into intestacy, the formal execution process can be seen as one of
probate’s family-protection mechanisms, alongside the elective spousal
share and pretermitted heir statutes.
B. Promotion of Family Tailored Estate Planning
That will formalities serve as barriers to valid will execution
illustrates probate’s distrust of a testator’s ability to adequately provide
for his family. However, most testators do not disinherit their
relatives.169 In fact, most wills direct the testator’s estate primarily to
close family members.170 Therefore, probate’s distrust of a testator’s
ability to adequately provide for his family’s needs is not based fully on
because it cannot be a question of what he intended to do, but whether he has actually
followed the provisions of the statute.”); In re Will of McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499, 504
(N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1867) (“I have no doubt that this paper was intended by the testatrix as
her will, and that but for the [will formality] statute, it ought to have effect given to it so
far as she had legal power to make a will.”).
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. See supra Part I (describing in detail probate’s family-protection policy).
168. See supra Part I.D.
169. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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the possibility that a testator may disinherit family members but is also
founded upon a concern regarding how the testator dispenses assets
within the family. If a testator wants to dispose of his estate through a
validly executed will, probate attempts to ensure that the testator
disposes of his assets in a manner that best serves the needs of his family.
One traditional justification of freedom of testation is that it allows
the testator to create an intelligent estate plan.171 Every family is
different, and only the testator knows the particular needs of his
family.172 The law acknowledges these familial differences and provides
the testator the freedom to dispense his estate as he so chooses, which
allows the testator to take into account the special needs of his family
when creating his testamentary scheme.173 The roots of this justification
of testamentary freedom, which scholars have characterized as the
“‘father knows best’ hypothesis,”174 extend as far back as the eighteenth
century when “Blackstone argued [that] restrictions on testamentary
freedom ‘prevented many provident fathers from dividing or charging
their estates as the exigence of their families required.’”175
The father-knows-best hypothesis has received some criticism.
Scholars have argued that while the law allows the testator to form a
family-tailored estate plan, there is no guarantee that the testator will
consider the special needs of his family.176 “[C]ertain factors militate
against the proposition” that “testamentary freedom typically gives rise
to intelligent estate planning.”177 One such factor is the possibility that
171. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1992).
172. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 44 (1995) (“Certainly, benefactors can be
expected to possess the information and insight into their families’ affairs necessary to
distribute their wealth in a rational manner.”); Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love:
Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 484
(2006) (“[T]he testator knows his family members better than anyone else . . . .”).
173. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 171, at 12; Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty
and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 163, 177 (1996) (“Testamentary freedom . . . allows the testator to weigh the
varying needs of his family.”); Tate, supra note 172, at 484 (“[T]he testator . . . can
distribute property in accordance [with] each family member’s needs.”).
174. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 171, at 12.
175. Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 109, 126–27 (2006) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*12).
176. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 171, at 13 (“Father may know best; but, alas, we have
no assurance that in practice he will do what is best.” (emphasis omitted)).
177. Id.

GLOVER

436

(Macro Approved 10-27)

12/4/2012 3:43 PM

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. 34

testators may put little thought into the process of creating an estate
plan.178 If the testator does not fully consider the special needs of his
family, he likely will not create an intelligent testamentary scheme.
However, while merely providing the testator the freedom to develop a
testamentary scheme does not assure that he will develop a familytailored estate plan, the presence of formalities in the will-execution
process can be seen as a mechanism to encourage the testator to consider
his family’s specific needs.
Formalities transform the will-execution process into a ceremony.179
The testator must perform certain tasks; witnesses must observe the
testator’s actions, and oftentimes legal assistance is needed to complete
the process.180 This ceremonial nature of the process encourages the
testator to fully consider the consequences of the testamentary
disposition of his estate, including not only the legal nature of the
process, but also the importance of how the will disposes of his estate.181
Certainly, this ritual function of will formalities does not ensure that the
testator will create a family-tailored estate plan, but it does encourage the
testator at least to consider the consequences of his actions. Absent will
formalities, the testator may hastily create a will without carefully
considering how best to devise the estate’s assets. However, the formal
nature of the will-execution process encourages the testator to fully
consider the needs of his family. After contemplating these needs, the
testator may be more likely to “direct property to those family members,
close or distant in relation, that have the greatest need.”182
C. Efficient Administration of the Probate Estate
Mandatory formal requirements in the will-execution process and
testators’ use of lawyers to meet those requirements183 standardize the
vast number of wills that courts probate each year.184 The result of this
channeling function of will formalities is “considerable uniformity in the
organization, language, and content of most wills.”185
In turn,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.; Rosenbloum, supra note 173, at 177; Tate, supra note 172, at 484.
See supra Part II.C.i.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.i.
Turnipseed, supra note 31, at 760.
See Friedman, supra note 87, at 368.
See supra Part II.C.iv.
Langbein, supra note 8, at 494.
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standardization and uniformity of wills promotes the efficient
administration of the testator’s estate, which furthers probate’s familyprotection policy in two ways.
First, the more efficiently the court probates the estate, the less the
estate’s funds are depleted through payment of attorney fees and court
costs. “Much is heard [today] about the excessive cost of probate—or, as
some have put it, the high cost of dying.”186 In fact, studies have found
that, even in relatively simple cases, attorney fees alone can consume as
much as five percent of the testator’s estate.187 In addition to attorney
fees, the administrative costs of probate include “probate court fees, the
commission of the personal representative, . . . and sometimes
appraiser’s and guardian ad litem’s fees.”188 The channeling function of
will formalities and the resulting efficiency of the probate process help
keep down these court costs and legal fees. Absent formalities in the
will-execution process, the probate court would spend more time and
effort interpreting the will.189 Consequently, legal fees and court costs
would consume an even greater portion of the estate. Therefore, because
the majority of testators leave the bulk of their estates to close
relatives,190 will formalities protect the family by preserving the estate’s
assets through the channeling function. With less consumption of the
estate by probate’s administrative costs, more money is put in the hands
of the family.
186. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 37; see Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer,
Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 108 (2007) (“[N]on-lawyers warn [people] of the incredible
expenses, delays, and frustration their heirs will experience when dealing with
probate . . . .”); Ben Kusmin, Note, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the
Disinterested Witness Requirement for Advance Directives, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 100
(2006) (reporting that “[n]umerous trust arrangements have . . . been developed to avoid
the delay and expense of probate”); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and
the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1116 (1984) (“The probate
system has earned a lamentable reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, makework,
and worse.”).
187. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 37 (describing a 1988 study of ten large
states); see also David S. Lande, Explaining Legal Fees for Probate, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 40,
44 (1988) (“[T]he national average cost of probate was roughly about . . . five (5%)
percent of the gross estate . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Garry A. Pearson & Chad E.
Pearson, Introduction to Probate and Estate Planning, 74 N.D. L. REV. 177, 181 (1998)
(reporting “hav[ing] seen advertisements claiming that up to twelve percent of a
decedent’s estate may be consumed by probate costs.”).
188. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 37.
189. See supra Part II.C.iv.
190. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.

GLOVER

438

(Macro Approved 10-27)

Oklahoma City University Law Review

12/4/2012 3:43 PM

[Vol. 34

The second way in which efficient administration of the probate
estate furthers probate’s family-protection policy is simply by reducing
the amount of time the court takes to probate the estate. The probate
process can be a difficult time for the family members of the decedent.
Though some elderly clients may possess unfounded fears of probate,
exemplified by the common sentiment of not “‘want[ing] [their]
famil[ies] to go through the horrors of probate,’”191 practicing lawyers do
recognize the toll probate can have on families. One practitioner has
observed that “[i]t’s hard to lose someone you love, and then deal with
all of the financial and legal complexities resulting from a probate.”192
Another explained that “[t]he months following a death in the family can
be hard—not only because of the grief and sorrow you feel, but also
because there are many components related to the estate that must be
dealt with.”193 The channeling function of will formalities provides will
uniformity, ease in judicial interpretation, and, consequently, efficient
administration of the estate.194 By fostering this swift probate process,
will formalities protect families by quickly removing a distraction from
the lives of still grieving family members.
D. The Psychological Effect of the Ceremony
Estate planning and the preparation of a will can be a very difficult
process because it forces the testator to contemplate his own death.195
No one enjoys thinking about and preparing for such things.196 In fact,

191. Jeffrey McKenna, Legal Issues for the Elderly: Probate—What is it?, SENIOR
SAMPLER WEEKLY MAGAZINE, Oct. 3, 2007, available at http://web.archive.org/web/2007
1014055109/http://seniorsampler.com.
192. StaceyRomberg.com, http://www.staceyromberg.com/legal-services.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2009).
193. SallyMihlon.com, http://web.archive.org/web/20080116151337/http://www.sally
mihlon.com/CM/Custom/TOCPracticeAreaDescriptions.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
194. See supra Part II.C.iv.
195. See Beyer, supra note 1, at 419 (“[M]any individuals procrastinate making a will
since the execution of a will is an admission of their mortality.”); see also Charles I.
Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the
Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 348 (1979) (“It is perhaps true that facing the
reality of death and its attendant consequences is one of the most difficult responsibilities
in life.”).
196. See Beyer, supra note 1, at 419 (“Most people do not enjoy thinking about death,
especially their own.”); Thomas L. Shaffer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and
Values Destroyed By Death, 55 IOWA L. REV. 376, 377 (1969) (“[D]eath is an unpleasant
fact to modern man.”).
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“personal death is a thought modern man will do almost anything to
avoid.”197 Consequently, a testator may experience great anxiety and
other psychological and emotional effects from contemplating his own
mortality.198 Absent some other coping mechanism, the testator’s family
would be left to help the testator deal with this anxiety, a responsibility
that may be quite burdensome and may be difficult to fulfill given that
the family may experience the same anxiety from contemplating the
testator’s death.
Fortunately,
[a] proper ceremony, coupled with sensitive and tactful
counseling by the attorney during the entire estate planning
process, may make it easier for clients to cope with the
inevitability of death. . . . [I]t may [also] help clients become
“more aware of their lives [and] more reconciled to what is real
in their lives . . . .”199
Therefore, by requiring testators to perform the ceremony of proper
will execution and by encouraging consultation with an attorney to meet
these formal requirements,200 will formalities provide the testator an
opportunity to receive counseling from a lawyer, which can relieve some
of the fear and anxiety of estate planning.201 Furthermore, the ceremony
197. Shaffer, supra note 196, at 377.
198. See Beyer, supra note 1, at 419–20. Beyer identified seven consequences of death
on which testators may focus, including that:
(1) they no longer can have any life experiences;
(2) they may be uncertain as to what will happen to them if there is a life after
death;
(3) they may be afraid of what will happen to their bodies after death;
(4) they realize they will no longer be able to care for their dependents;
(5) they realize that their death will cause grief to their relatives and friends;
(6) they realize that all their plans and projects will come to an end; and
(7) they may be afraid that the process of dying might be painful.
Id.
199. Id. at 420 (quoting Shaffer, supra note 196, at 377).
200. See Friedman, supra note 87, at 368.
201. See Shaffer, supra note 196, at 376 (“Lawyers who advise clients and draft
documents in the ‘estate planning’ practice are counselors in more than the traditional
legal sense. They are also counselors in the therapeutic or developmental sense.”);
Thomas L. Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young Family Clients and the Psychology of
Testation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 377 (1969) (suggesting “that advertent, informed
planning for property settlement is therapy for death anxiety”).
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itself can provide great intangible satisfactions about the significant
decisions that accompany the exercise of testamentary power.202 In sum,
will formalities’ ceremonial function furthers probate’s family-protection
policy by reducing the burden of consoling a testator, who is dealing
with the negative psychological and emotional effects of estate planning
that would inevitably fall upon the testator’s family.
The formal will-execution process promotes probate’s familyprotection policy in various ways, but the law does not require testators
to navigate a formal process in all contexts. While the law requires a
formal process of will execution, testators are able to revoke their wills
in a relatively informal manner. Scholars have argued that this
difference in the execution and revocation processes makes little sense.203
Conversely, this article argues that when viewed in the context of
probate’s family-protection policy, the rationale for requiring a formal
execution process while providing an informal revocation process
becomes clear. However, to appreciate how informal revocation
promotes probate’s family-protection policy, one must first understand
the nature of the revocation process.
IV. WILL REVOCATION
“[O]ne of the inherent characteristics of a will is its revocability.”204
Because of a will’s ambulatory nature, a testator who still possesses the
mental capacity required to create a will may alter, amend, or completely
invalidate a will.205 All states allow revocation by two primary
methods—revocation by a subsequent writing and revocation by a
physical act.206

202. Beyer, supra note 1, at 420. In Herman Melville’s classic novel Moby-Dick,
Ishmael describes the psychological effect of creating a will: “After the ceremony was
concluded upon the present occasion, I felt all the easier; a stone was rolled away from
my heart.” HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK OR, THE WHALE 249 (Penguin Books 2003)
(1851).
203. See Langbein, supra note 139, at 29 n.133.
204. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.1.
205. See Cozzort v. Cunningham, 130 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (“It is
fundamental that a person having the right to dispose of his property by will may, during
his lifetime while he retains testamentary capacity, change, modify or completely revoke
a previously executed will . . . .”).
206. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 251.
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A. Revocation by Subsequent Writing
The first method of revocation is the execution of a subsequent
writing, which may either explicitly or implicitly revoke a will.207 A
subsequent writing may explicitly revoke a will by declaring the
testator’s intent to revoke.208 If a document that explicitly revokes a will
provides instructions for the testamentary disposition of the decedent’s
estate, the estate will be distributed accordingly.209 However, if the
testator simply revokes the will without providing further instruction, the
decedent’s estate will pass through intestacy.210 In either case, the
writing must satisfy the formal requirements of will execution.211 If the
decedent does not follow the requirements of the will formalities in
executing the revocatory document, the revocation is invalid and the
decedent’s estate will pass according to the terms of the will.212
In all states, a testator may implicitly revoke a will with a subsequent
writing by executing a will that is inconsistent with a previous will.213 A
presumption arises that the testator intended revocation of the previous
will if the subsequent will completely disposes of the decedent’s
estate.214 However, if the subsequent will does not make a complete
disposition, courts treat the subsequent writing as a codicil and still
recognize the original will as valid.215
207. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.33; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)
(1993) (“A will or any part thereof is revoked . . . by executing a subsequent will that
revokes the previous will or part expressly or by inconsistency . . . .”).
208. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.43.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. § 21.1 (“It is almost universally required that the instrument be a formal
one executed with the same formalities required in the making of a will.”); see also
Kronauge v. Stoecklein, 293 N.E.2d 320, 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (holding that will
formalities “must be strictly complied with in order to make [a] revocation effective”).
212. See Flagle v. Martintelli, 360 N.E.2d 1269, 1271–72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977);
Sanchez v. Martinez (In re Estate of Martinez), 985 P.2d 1230, 1232 (N.M. Ct. App.
1999) (“[T]he trial court erred in concluding that the decedent revoked his will, and did
so because this instrument purporting to do so does not satisfy the will
requirement . . . .”).
213. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.1; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)
(1993) (“A will or any part thereof is revoked: (1) by executing a subsequent will that
revokes the previous will or part . . . by inconsistency . . . .”).
214. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 252; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(c)
(1993).
215. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 252; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(d)
(1993).
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Revocation by subsequent writing can be seen as a formal process
because subsequent revocatory writings must satisfy the formal
requirements of will execution. Like the difficulty testators may
experience when executing a will,216 testators may find revocation by
subsequent writing difficult because of the formal nature of the process.
However, testators who want to revoke their wills can avoid this
difficulty. Revocation by physical act provides testators an informal
revocatory process and a much easier path to revocation.
B. Revocation by Physical Act
The Statute of Frauds allowed a testator to revoke a will “by
burning[,] cancelling[,] teareing or obliterating the [document].”217
Today, most states have adopted revocation statutes containing
substantially similar language.218 To achieve revocation through this
process, a testator must not only perform the destructive act but must
also intend to revoke the will.219 In other words, a testator cannot
accidentally revoke a will through a destructive act.220
Revocation by destruction is a relatively simple and informal
process. Despite the significance of revocation and unlike the process of
revocation by subsequent writing, a testator may revoke a will by
physical act without adhering to the formal requirements of will
execution. As a result, the testator may achieve revocation without
executing a written, signed, and witnessed document.
V. INFORMAL REVOCATION AS FAMILY PROTECTION
Compared to the formal process of will execution, revoking a will by
physical act is a relatively informal process. Revocation occurs if the
testator destroys the will with an intent to revoke. The testator need not
complete any of the formal requirements of will execution. With the

216. See supra Part III.A.
217. Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 6 (1676).
218. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 46, § 5.2 (“The slight differences in
wording among the statutes are not usually important.”); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
2-507(a)(2) (1993) (permitting revocation by “burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or
destroying the will or any part of it”).
219. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.4; see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)(2)
(1993).
220. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.28.
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absence of formal requirements arises the question of why the law places
barriers on will execution while leaving the way to will revocation
relatively free and clear. This article asserts that, like the formal
execution process, an informal revocation process promotes probate’s
family-protection policy.
A. Channeling Testators to Intestacy
i. The Purpose of the Destructive Act
Originally, the “essential” element of will revocation was the
testator’s intent to revoke.221 Destruction of the will was not needed, and
a testator could revoke a will by a simple oral declaration.222 “This loose
method of revocation resulted in many bold attempts to defeat wills by
false testimony concerning the declaration of the testator.”223 In part
because of the fraud that accompanied this method of revocation,
England adopted the Statute of Frauds in 1676, which altered the
available methods of revocation so that “a written will disposing of either
real estate or personal property could not be revoked by mere parol.”224
The prohibition of oral revocation found its way into American law, and
today no state recognizes will revocation based solely on an oral

221. In re Grattan’s Estate, 138 P.2d 497, 499 (Kan. 1943).
222. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 21.2; Robert Whitman, Revocation and
Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the Uniform Probate Code and Suggestions
for the Future, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1992) (providing a brief history of English
revocation law).
223. In re Grattan’s Estate, 138 P.2d at 499. The English case of Cole v. Mordaunt
illustrates the fraud that accompanied oral revocation:
In that case, an elderly testator had married a woman many years his junior.
The testator had written a will three years before his death that devised a large
portion of his estate to charity. After the testator’s death, the widow “induced
nine persons to perjure themselves” and testify that the testator had, while on
his deathbed, orally revoked the will and made a new nuncupative will leaving
his estate to his wife. When the fraudulent scheme was uncovered on appeal,
the nuncupative will was rejected at probate. One judge who presided over the
case, Lord Nottingham, “remarked that he hoped ‘to see one day, a law, that no
written will should be revoked but by writing.’”
Whitman, supra note 222, at 1038 (quoting ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS,
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS 9 (1928) (footnotes
omitted)).
224. In re Grattan’s Estate, 138 P.2d at 499–50; see Statute for the Prevention of Fraud
and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Whitman, supra note 222, at 1038.
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declaration by the testator.225 With this historical background in mind,
one can view the destructive act requirement as a formality designed to
fulfill the protective, evidentiary, ritual, and channeling functions
associated with other will formalities.
The destructive act’s fulfillment of the protective function is closely
tied with its fulfillment of the evidentiary function. The requirement’s
main objective was to protect against fraud, but the destructive act
accomplished this by providing evidence of the testator’s intent to
revoke. An oral revocation leaves the probate court with nothing but the
testimony of witnesses to determine whether the testator intended
revocation, but a destructive act provides the court the remnants of a
destroyed will or at least the absence of a will as evidence of revocatory
intent. Additionally, the requirement of a destructive act to some extent
achieves the ritual and channeling functions of will formalities. Like the
will-execution requirements of a written document accompanied by the
testator’s signature, the requirement of a destructive act could be seen as
a ceremonial process forcing the testator to devote some minimal amount
of thought to the consequences of revocation. If allowed to orally revoke
a will, a testator could impulsively make a revocatory declaration, but the
destructive act requirement forces the testator to take the time to find the
will and actually go through with the destructive act. Additionally, a
destructive act channels all nonwritten revocations into a similar form,
which the court may be more able to recognize and interpret than a mere
oral revocation.
ii. Informal Revocation v. Formal Revocation
Though the requirement of a destructive act partially fulfills the
functions of will formalities, a destructive act does not do so as
effectively as the formal requirements of will formation, namely a
written, signed, and witnessed document.226 To begin with, while the
law places prohibitions on oral revocation to prevent fraud, revocation by
destruction does not fulfill the protective function as well as other formal

225. In re Grattan’s Estate, 138 P.2d at 500; see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at
252 (“On the assumption that oral revocations would open the door wide for fraud, an
oral declaration that a will is revoked, without more, is inoperative in all states.”).
226. Langbein, supra note 8, at 522 n.117 (stating that a “revoking instrument usually
serves the evidentiary, cautionary and channeling policies far better than unwitnessed
physical mutilation”).
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requirements.227 Though fraudulent destruction may be more difficult
than mere fraudulent testimony, the possibility of fraudulent destruction
may be great, as those family members who stand to benefit from
revocation and the subsequent distribution of the decedent’s estate
through intestacy may have ample opportunity to destroy a testator’s
will.228 A formal process, requiring compliance with will formalities to
revoke a will, would place additional burdens that a wrongdoer would
have to overcome to fraudulently revoke a will.229 Additionally,
revocation by physical act provides minimal protection from undue
influence. In order for someone to unduly influence the testator to
revoke a will by physical act, the person’s influence over the testator
must only be brief because of the ease with which the testator may
perform the revocation. Contrarily, the influencer would have to
overcome the testator for an extended period of time to achieve
revocation if the testator were required to execute a formal written
document. In sum, the formalities of will execution would better protect
the testator from fraud and undue influence than the sole requirement of
a destructive act.
Likewise, a written, signed, and witnessed revocation would provide
more evidence of the testator’s intent to revoke than does a destructive
act. “Effective physical revocation can be done in private—without
witnesses and without evidence about the circumstances of
revocation.”230 Whereas revocation by destruction provides the court
227. See Langbein, supra note 139, at 29 n.133 (suggesting that a “[p]hysical act
without more must be ambiguous on . . . whether the act was . . . done by the testator”
and that “virtually all the permitted modes of revocation by physical act are intrinsically
more ambiguous than revocation by writing” (quoting LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON THE MAKING AND REVOCATION OF WILLS 67–68 (1981))).
228. This possibility of destruction is especially true when wills are left in the
possession of the testator. Those that stand to benefit from the testator’s estate passing
through intestacy, namely the testator’s family, are the ones who will likely find the will
upon the testator’s death. If these family members are disinherited by the will, they may
take the opportunity to destroy the will and benefit through intestacy. See Dickey v.
Malechi, 6 Mo. 177, 188 (1839) (stating that “[t]he relations of a testator are most likely
to be . . . around and about his person and house during his last illness” and are “the
persons most likely to be interested in suppressing the will”); see, e.g., In re
Washington’s Estate, 56 So. 2d 545, 546–47 (Fla. 1952).
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 541, 562 (1990); see Livingston W. Cleaveland, J., In re Augur, Memorandum of
Decision, 9 YALE L.J. 259, 263 (1900) (“It is ordinary experience that wills, the legal
execution of which necessarily involves more or less publicity, are frequently destroyed
in secret . . . .”).
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with only the destroyed document or the absence of the will as evidence
of the testator’s intent, a written document would provide the court with
a clear statement of the testator’s intent. Furthermore, the attestation
requirement would provide the testimony of disinterested witnesses who
observed the revocation.231 Additionally, the destruction of a will does
not necessarily suggest that the testator intended revocation, as
“[m]utilation can always be accidental.”232 A formal written revocation
will never be executed inadvertently and, therefore, provides the court
with better evidence of revocatory intent.233
Moreover, revocation by destruction does not satisfy the ritual
function of will formalities to the same extent as does revocation by a
written instrument. In the will-execution process, the requirements that
the testator write out his desired testamentary scheme and sign the
document in the presence of witnesses impresses upon the testator the
significance of his actions.234 Revocation by physical act does not force
the testator to contemplate his actions in the same way. A testator’s
desire to revoke a will may be fleeting, brought about by a beneficiary’s
actions that on second thought would not warrant revocation.235
Revocation by destruction allows the testator to act on these whims and
to revoke a will the instant the thought enters the testator’s mind. By
contrast, a mandatory formal-revocation process requiring the testator to
execute a written revocatory document would provide testators greater
opportunity to second-guess the motivation behind their revocatory
desire.
Finally, a formal revocation process would more effectively satisfy
the channeling function of will formalities. A testator can attempt to
destroy a will by a number of different means and to varying degrees.
For example, the Uniform Probate Code authorizes revocation by
“burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or any

231. See supra Part II.B.
232. Langbein, supra note 8, at 522 n.117; see, e.g., Bakhaus v. Bakhause (In re
Bakhaus’ Estate), 102 N.E.2d 818, 819–20 (Ill. 1951).
233. See Langbein, supra note 139, at 29 n.133 (quoting LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON THE MAKING AND REVOCATION OF WILLS 67–68 (1981))
(suggesting that revocation by physical act is more ambiguous than a formal written
revocation and provides better evidence of animus revocandi).
234. See supra Part II.C.
235. See Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251, 257 (1882) (explaining that a testator
can be “fickle and inconstant, and at one time . . . favor[] one or more of his children, and
at other times dislike[] [them] and favor[] others”).
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part of it.”236 This variation in destructive techniques can result in the
court having to interpret whether a particular act constitutes destructive
revocation or whether destruction of only a portion of a document
constitutes destruction of the entire will.237 A requirement that all
revocations be a written, signed, and witnessed document would channel
all revocations into a similar form. This uniformity would allow for
greater ease in judicial interpretation of revocations and would eliminate
some of the uncertainty that accompanies revocation by physical act.
The law’s lack of concern with fulfilling the functions of will
formalities in the revocation process is clear. Indeed, a more formal
revocation process would better fulfill the protective, evidentiary, ritual,
and channeling functions. Just as the law makes will execution difficult
because the testator is removing his estate from intestacy and possibly
distributing assets to nonfamily members,238 the law makes the process
of revoking a will simple in order to encourage testators to eliminate
their self-designed distributive schemes. Once the will is revoked, the
testator’s estate passes through intestacy, which ensures distribution of
the estate to family members. By providing this informal revocation
process, the law encourages revocation and intestacy, and furthers
probate’s family-protection policy.
B. The Presumption of Revocation
In addition to allowing revocation of a will through the informal
process of destruction, the law presumes that the testator intended
revocation if the will is destroyed and found in the testator’s
belongings.239 This presumption of revocation is a burden-shifting

236. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)(2) (1993).
237. For example, if a testator attempts to revoke a will by burning it, the court may
have to decide what degree of burning is sufficient to revoke the will by destruction. See
Payne v. Payne, 100 S.E.2d 450, 450–52 (Ga. 1957) (finding insufficient destruction to
revoke a will that had only been singed at the edges). Courts must interpret evidence of
destruction by other means as well. See In re Estate of Sweetland, 710 N.Y.S.2d 668,
670 (App. Div. 2000) (finding no revocation of a will containing staple holes); see also
PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, §§ 21.6–.14 (describing the multitude of destructive
means a testator may use to revoke a will).
238. See supra Part III.A.
239. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 29.140; see True v. Funk (In re Johannes’
Estate), 227 P.2d 148, 151 (Kan. 1951); Bonner v. Borst (In re Will of Bonner), 214
N.E.2d 154, 155 (N.Y. 1966); Orgill v. Roberts (In re Tyler’s Estate), 112 N.E.2d 668,
671 (Ohio 1953).
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mechanism that requires the proponent of the will to prove that the
testator did not intend revocation.240 Not only does the law presume that
the testator intended revocation when the will is found destroyed, the law
also presumes that the testator destroyed the will and intended revocation
when the will cannot be found at all.241 This presumption arises only
when a will that was known to be in the possession of the testator cannot
be found upon the testator’s death because if the testator did not have
possession of the will prior to death, he could not have performed the
destructive act.242
These presumptions set revocation and, consequently, intestacy as
the default position. Rather than presuming that a will is valid and
requiring proof of revocatory intent, the law presumes revocation and
requires proof that the testator did not intend revocation. The traditional
justification for presuming revocation is that testators commonly destroy
wills with revocatory intent. Therefore, a presumption of revocation
more frequently fulfills the testator’s intent than would a presumption of
validity.243 However, these presumptions of revocation can also be
viewed as family-protection mechanisms. By presuming the testator
intended to revoke a testamentary document, probate courts increase the
likelihood that the testator’s estate will pass through intestacy. Without a

240. See Harrison v. Bird, 621 So. 2d 972, 973 (Ala. 1993).
241. Gayla D. Lee, Note, Wills—Revocation—A Presumption of Revocation in
Duplicate Will Cases—In re Shaw, 572 P.2d 299 (Okla. 1977), 12 CREIGHTON L. REV.
729, 731–32 (1978); see Porter v. Sheffield, 208 S.W.2d 999, 1019 (Ark. 1948); Mimms
v. Hunt, 458 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Ky. 1970); Goodwin v. Goodwin (In re Estate of
Goodwin), 18 P.3d 373, 376 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000).
242. Lee, supra note 241, at 732.
243. Id. (“Because of the ambulatory character of the will, and its availability to the
testator, it is reasonable to presume that the unfound will was intentionally destroyed.”).
PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 29.139 explains the presumption of revocation for lost
wills:
This presumption has been adopted as the rule which conforms most [with] the
actual facts of human life. While wills are occasionally destroyed by
disinherited heirs, they are much more frequently destroyed by testator[s], with
the intention of revoking them. This presumption, therefore, takes the normal
case as the standard, and requires affirmative evidence of the abnormal case.
Id.
PAGE ON WILLS goes on to explain the rationale for the presumption of revocation when a
will is found destroyed: “The reason for this presumption is the same as that for the
presumption which arises where the will cannot be found on [the] testator’s death,
namely that it is more reasonable to suppose that the will was destroyed or canceled by
testator in his lifetime.” Id. § 29.140.

GLOVER

2009]

(Macro Approved 10-27)

Probate’s Family Protection Policy

12/4/2012 3:43 PM

449

presumption of revocation, a will contestant would have to prove
invalidity of the will, and if the contestant were unable to do so, the
decedent’s estate would be distributed according to the terms of the will.
By presuming revocatory intent on the part of the decedent, the
contestant will more likely prevail and the decedent’s estate will more
likely be distributed to the decedent’s family though intestacy.
The presumption’s role in family protection becomes clearer when
one considers the possible consequences of leaving a will in the
possession of the testator. First, when a validly executed will is left in
the testator’s possession, lawyers instruct the client to keep the will in a
safe place, such as a safe deposit box or on file with the clerk of the
probate court.244 However, sometimes a testator “take[s] too seriously
the lawyer’s advice on safeguarding the will, with the result that the will
cannot be located after death.”245 In addition to overzealously protecting
the will, “[t]he testator . . . may [simply] misplace his will through
carelessness, forgetfulness, or neglect.”246 Second, the testator may not
take adequate measures to protect the will, and the will may be destroyed
accidently.247 Finally, destruction of the will may be intentional but not
constitute a revocatory act, as “wills are occasionally destroyed by
disinherited heirs.”248 In all of these contexts, the testator did not intend
revocation of the lost or destroyed will, yet the presumption of
revocation may make it difficult for the proponent of the will to prove
the will’s validity and prevent the decedent’s estate from passing through
intestacy.
“Where the presumption arises . . . the proponent of the will has the
burden of overcoming it.”249 However, “[o]vercoming the presumption
of revocation . . . is not a simple matter.”250 The articulated burden of
244. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning
Practices—Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 124–25 (1984); see also
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 218.
245. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 218–19.
246. John E. Walsh, Jr., Comment, Lost Wills and the Register of Wills, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 450, 452 (1963).
247. See id.; Langbein, supra note 8, at 522 n.117.
248. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 29.139; see Johnston, supra note 244, at 124
(“If, for example, a will was kept in a desk at home, someone who would stand to gain by
intestacy might locate the will and mutilate or destroy it during the testator’s last illness
or immediately after death.”).
249. Daul v. Goff, 754 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
250. Julie Leonard Smith, Note, Allowing the Probate of Duplicate Wills: Overcoming
the Presumption of Revocation and Conflicts with the Statute of Wills, 9 CONN. PROB. L.J.
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proof necessary to rebut the presumption of revocation varies from state
to state, but generally it is “greater than a mere preponderance [of the
evidence].”251 For instance, in California a will proponent may rebut the
presumption of revocation by providing “substantial evidence” that the
testator did not intend revocation.252 A will proponent can satisfy this
burden by showing “that [the] testator ‘at all times referred to his will as
being in existence and at no time made any indication of a desire to
revoke or destroy it.’”253 Similarly, in Iowa, a will proponent must
present “clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence” to rebut the
presumption.254 Additional states require various other standards of
evidence that are greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence to
overcome the presumption.255 Regardless of the words used to describe
the burden of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of revocation, a
will proponent must overcome a substantial obstacle to persuade the
court to admit the will to probate and to prevent the decedent’s estate
from passing through intestacy.
The difficulty a will proponent faces is illustrated by the high
evidentiary burdens present in cases where revocation may be least
likely. Even when an intestate beneficiary had strong incentive and
ample opportunity to destroy a will, most courts require more than “[t]he
mere fact that a contestant had an opportunity to destroy the will” to
“overcome the presumption that it was destroyed by the testator with the
intent to revoke.”256 For example, an Illinois court refused to find the
87, 88 (1994).
251. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 78, § 29.139.
252. Wilson v. Caskey (In re Estate of Obernolte), 153 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801 (Ct. App.
1979).
253. Citizens Nat’l Trust & Sav. Bank of L.A. v. Blank (In re Estate of Hoffman), 290
P.2d 669, 673 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
254. Iowa Wesleyan Coll. v. Jackson, 86 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1957).
255. See In re Estate of Tallant v. Tallant, 644 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Miss. 1994)
(requiring “clear and convincing” evidence); In re Dalbey’s Estate, 192 A. 129, 130 (Pa.
1937) (requiring “positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence”).
Different phrases have been used by the courts to describe the character of proof
necessary to overcome the legal presumption of revocation in cases of this kind, such
expressions as ‘conclusive proof’, ‘the clearest and most stringent proof’, and other
combinations of words having similar meaning. We feel that these various phrases reach
the same point, which is for the evidence to be sufficient to overcome the presumption it
must be clear and convincing leading to the conclusion that the will was not revoked.
Sutherland v. Sutherland, 66 S.E.2d 537, 539 (Va. 1951).
256. Peters v. Melville (In re Estate of Travers), 589 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978); see Daul v. Goff, 754 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Moos v. Moos
(In re Moos’ Estate), 110 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ill. 1953) (“[I]t will not be presumed that a
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presumption rebutted in a case where the will was found by the
decedent’s niece, who was also the sole intestate heir.257 Not only would
the niece have received an additional $10,000 by the decedent dying
intestate, but she also had ample opportunity to destroy the will, as she
found both the decedent’s body and will and was the only person living
with the decedent at the time of his death.258 Despite the niece’s motive
and opportunity to destroy the will, the court did not find sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption of revocation.259
In sum, the law presumes that a testator revoked a will if the will was
destroyed or lost, despite the possibility that a will could be destroyed or
lost for reasons other than revocation. Though a proponent of a lost or
destroyed will may overcome the presumption, rebuttal is difficult
because courts set high evidentiary standards. All of this works together
to promote probate’s family-protection policy by making revocation
more likely and by increasing the chances that the testator’s estate will
pass to family members through intestacy. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Illinois has openly acknowledged its preference for intestacy and the role
the presumption of revocation plays in facilitating intestate distribution
when the court stated that because “a will . . . permits a person to dispose
of his property contrary to the way the [intestacy] law prescribes, . . . the
presumption against the validity of a will which has been mutilated
should not be lightly set aside.”260

lost will has been destroyed by any other person, without the knowledge of or authority
of the testator, even though such person may have had the motive and the
opportunity . . . .”).
257. Taylor v. Cummings (In re Estate of Riner), 207 N.E.2d 487, 488–90 (Ill. App. Ct.
1965).
258. Id. at 488–89. Another example of a court finding that the presumption was not
rebutted is a case where the decedent’s step-granddaughter received a greater portion of
the estate by the deletion of another beneficiary from the will. The presumption was not
rebutted even though the step-granddaughter had access to the safe deposit box
containing the will. In re Hildebrand’s Estate, 76 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. 1950). Courts have
found the presumption or revocation rebutted in extreme circumstances. For instance, the
Supreme Court of Florida found the presumption rebutted in a case where two
disinherited brothers ransacked their mother’s room in search of will. After the incident,
other family members could not find the decedent’s will, but the court was satisfied that
the testator did not intend a revocation. In re Washington’s Estate, 56 So. 2d 545, 546
(Fla. 1952).
259. Taylor, 207 N.E.2d at 490.
260. Bakhaus v. Bakhaus (In re Bakhaus’ Estate), 102 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. 1951).
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C. Partial Revocation by Physical Act
Though most states allow a testator to partially revoke a will,261 in
several states partial revocation by a physical act is prohibited.262 This
prohibition of partial revocation is explained as an attempt to prevent
fraud, as the person who may perform the revocatory act may also
benefit from partial revocation.263 A second rationale is that “canceling a
gift to one person necessarily results in someone else taking the gift, and
this ‘new gift’—like all bequests—can be made only by an attested
writing.”264 These two explanations are not the only plausible rationales
for the prohibition of partial revocation by a physical act. Probate’s
family-protection policy may provide an additional explanation.
Perhaps states prohibit a testator from partially revoking a will
because, unlike full revocation, partial revocation is not completely
backstopped by intestacy. When a testator completely revokes a will, the
decedent’s estate will pass through intestacy if he does not execute a
subsequent will.265 However, if a testator only partially revokes a will,
the remaining provisions of the will are still valid. As a result, the
decedent’s estate will not necessarily pass through intestacy but will be
distributed according to the remaining terms of the will. If a will
contains no residuary clause, which disposes of all of the decedent’s
estate that is not specifically or generally devised,266 the assets disposed
of by the revoked provisions will pass through intestacy. However, this
is an unlikely occurrence because most testators have a residuary
clause.267 If the will does contain a residuary clause, the assets covered
261. See Frederic S. Schwartz, Models of Will Revocation, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 135, 149–50 (2004); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.284 (West 1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 394.080 (LexisNexis 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-10 (1995); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 853.11 (West 2002).
262. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 258; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-6
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
263. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 258.
264. Id.
265. See supra Part IV.
266. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (8th ed. 2004). A specific devise is “[a] devise
that passes a particular piece of property” and a general devise is “[a] devise . . . of a
specific amount of money or quantity of property, that is payable from the estate’s
general assets.” Id. at 483–84.
267. See Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Estate of Henry, 106 So. 2d 215, 222 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“While there are few absolutes in this area, we can notice judicially,
if we need, that contemporary wills more often than not use the residuary clause to carry
out the most important provisions.”); In re Fetter’s Estate, 30 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super.
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by the revoked provisions will not pass through intestacy but will be
distributed to the residual beneficiary.268
Therefore, states may be reluctant to allow partial revocation by
physical act because the assets disposed of by the revoked provisions
will not likely pass through intestacy. Absent the benefit of additional
property passing through intestacy to the decedent’s family, the law may
consider the possibility of fraud a sufficient justification to prohibit
partial revocation by destruction. Complete revocation by physical act
invites the same threat of fraud. However, the law weighs this threat
with the benefit of distributing assets to the decedent’s family and
ultimately values the promotion of probate’s family-protection policy.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, scholars have strongly criticized will formalities and
their tendency to frustrate testamentary intent. This criticism has
initiated changes both in the nature of the required will formalities and in
the method by which courts judge compliance with the formal
requirements. Absent from the scholarly debate, however, is the role
these formal requirements play in probate’s overarching familyprotection policy. As this article argues, the formal execution process
serves a family-protection policy by making the exercise of testamentary
power difficult, by encouraging testators to develop a family tailored
estate plan, by aiding in the efficient administration of the probate estate,
and by helping the testator cope with the stress that accompanies
contemplation of one’s mortality. However, while the law forces
testators to navigate the formal execution process to create a will,
testators may easily revoke a will through the informal process of
revocation by physical act.
Ct. 1943) (reporting that a “residuary clause . . . is present in most wills”); Brown v.
Brown, 74 S.E. 135, 136 (S.C. 1912) (describing the residuary clause as “that most
common feature” of wills).
268. See Brown, 74 S.E. at 136 (“The increase of the residuary estate which may result
from the obliteration is not a new testamentary disposition, but a mere incidental
consequence resulting from the exercise of the power conferred on the testator by the
statute.”); Wills—Partial Revocation and Interpretation of Remaining Language, 103 U.
PA. L. REV. 988, 988–89 (1955) (explaining that the general rule that prohibits a partial
revocation that results in an increase of gift “is subject to the exception of increases in the
residue or increases in the shares of residuary legatees resulting from the striking of one
or more residuary legatees which are upheld on the rationale that the residue is the ‘catchall’ for all undisposed property”) (footnotes omitted).
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This discrepancy is ostensibly paradoxical. Indeed, the incongruence
between the formal execution process and the informal revocation
process has garnered criticism from the scholarly legal community.
However, when viewed in connection with probate’s family-protection
policy, the rationale for allowing testators to informally revoke their
wills becomes clear. The law makes it difficult to exercise testamentary
power out of concern that testators may not provide for their family
through their wills. Likewise, the law provides testators a relatively easy
revocation process because without a will the estate passes to the
decedent’s family through intestacy. In sum, one of probate’s primary
concerns is family protection. Both the formal execution process and the
informal revocation process are among many probate mechanisms
designed to further this family-protection policy.
Perhaps probate should not be concerned with family protection.
Perhaps the importance of testamentary freedom outweighs the familyprotection function of will formalities. In either case, the informalization
of the will-execution process may be justified. However, before more
state legislatures reduce the complexity of will formation by eliminating
various formal requirements and before courts universally heed the call
for the abandonment of strict compliance, the role of the formal
execution process in furthering probate’s family-protection policy should
be considered.

